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[So F. No. 18496. In Bank. Aug. 14, 1953.J 
WALTER ALVES, Petitioner, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES 
COMMISSION et a1.. Respondents. 
[1] Oarriers-Oarrtage of Property.-Evidence that a trucker is 
serving all profitable business offered within limitations of 
.equipment, that vast majority of shippers are served without 
contractual arrangements, and that no limit is placed on type 
or weight of product carried or on number of shippers seryed, 
could support a conclusion of Public Utilities Commission 
that trucker unequivocally intended to dedicate his propel'ty 
to public use. 
[2] Automobile Stages-Highway Carriers.-A "highway COID-
mon carrier ... subject to regulation as such" by Pul)lie 
Utilities Commission is a highway carrier transporting "prop-
erty as 8 common carrier for compensation . between 
fixed termini or over a regular route," while a common carrier 
by auto truck which does not operate between fixed termini 
or over a regular route is a "radial highway common car-
rier." (Pub. Uti!. Code. §§ 213. 3513. 3516.) 
[8] ld.-Highway Oarriers.-A "highway contract carrier" is 
every highway carrier which is not a common carrier operat-
ing between fixed termini or over a regular route; if it does 
not operate as a common carrier, the highway contract car-
rier may operate between fixed termini or over a regular 
route. (Pub. Util. Code. § 3517.) 
[4] ld.-Highway Oarriers.-A trucker who holds permits to 
operate both as a radial highway common carrier and as a 
highway contract carrier could legally operate as a common 
carrier; he could also transport goods as a contract carrier 
between fixed termini or over 8 regular route, but he could 
[1) See Cal. Jnr. lO-Yr.Supp. (1948 Rev.), Motor Transporta-
tion, § 3; Am.Jur., Motor Transportation, § 3. 
(2) See Cal.Jur. lO-Yr.Bupp (1948 Rev.), Motor Transporta-
tion, § 2. 
MeK. Dig. References: [1] Carriers, § 17; [2-6] Automobile 
Stages, §L 
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Dot operate as a common carrier between fixed termini or 
over a· regular route. 
[5] Id.-Righway Oarriers.-Rule of Public Utilities Commis-
sion that it will not consider a carrier's operations in seg-
ments and that, if a carrier operntes a portion of an inte-
grated business as a common carrier anel anether portion as 
a contract carrier between fixed termini, the commission will 
combine the entire business to find tllat the carrier is operat-
ing as a common carrier between fixed termini, is arbitrary 
and unreasonable, at least as applied to a carrier holding both 
radial highway common carrier and highway contract car-
rier permits. 
[6] Id.-Righway Oarriers.-Clear implication of Highway Car-
riers Act, § 4 (now Pub. Util. Code, § 3542), is that a carrier 
may engage in both common and contract can'iage so long as 
the same commodities are not carried between the same 
points in both capacities. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of Public Utilities Com-
mission directing petitioner to cease from operating as a high-
way common carrier. Order annulled. 
lIarquam C. George for Petitioner. 
Everett C. McKeage and J. Thomason Phelps for Re-
spondents. 
EDMONDS, J.-The Public Utilities. Commission insti-
tuted an investigation on its own motion into the operations 
and practices of Walter Alves, doing business as Alves Service 
Transportation. Following a hearing, the commission entered 
its order directing Alves to cease and desist from operating 
as a highway common carrier between certain designated 
cities unless and until he obtained a certificate of publi(\ con-
venience and necessity. The order also suspend.ed his permits 
to operate as a radial highway common carrier and as a high-
way contract carrier until further order of the commission 
upon a showing of good cause. 
In its opinion, the commission said: "Having carefully 
examined respondent's testimony in its entirety, we conclude 
that his operations are those of a common carrier. It is clear 
that the only restrictiveness placed upon such operations is 
controlled by the limitations of respondent's equipment and 
his desire to hold in reserve equipment adequate to meet the 
reqnirementsof so-called regular customers. This, in our 
/ 
/ 
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opinion, is not sufficient to remove the operations from a com-
mon carrier status." 
At the time of the opinion and order, this court had not 
decided Souza v. Public Utilities Com., 37 Ca1.2d 539 [233 
P.2d 537], and Samuelson v. Public Utilities Com., 36 Ca1.2d 
722 [227 P.2d 256]. Following the decision in the Samuelson 
case, the commission granted Alves a rehearing for the pur-
pose of considering its applicability, if any, to the issues de-
termined by the order against him. Pending rehearing, the 
Souza case also was decided. On rehearing, the commission 
entered a new order requiring Alves to cease and desist from 
operating without a certificate as a highway common carrier 
between designated fixed termini. The listing of prohibited 
termini was altered from that in the original order. The order 
on rehearing also suspended Alves' permits to operate as a 
radial highway common carrier and as a highway contract 
carrier, but the term of suspension was set at three days. 
The opinion on rehearing took cognizance of the Samuelson 
and Souza cases. Abandoning the ground of "restrictive-
ness" upon which it had relied in its original opinion, the 
commission stated: "We are aware that the court in the Sa.m-
uelson and Souza cases (supra) rejected the test of 'substan-
tial restrictiveness' for determining whether a trucker is a 
common carrier, and of course we respect and accept its judg-
ment. However, the evidence in this proceeding amply demon-
strates that the respondent has held out his services to the 
public or a portion thereof as is indicated by the wide variety 
of commodities he transported, shipments of which ranged in 
weight from one pound to 198,180 pounds, and the large num-
ber of persons he served in addition to the one shipper with 
whom he had a written contract and four others with whom he 
had oral arrangements. This record cogently establishes that 
the respondent has evinced the unequivocal intention to dedi-
cate his property to a public use required by the court's ruling 
in the Samuelson and Souza cases (supra), and we therefore 
:find that the respondent is engaged in common carriage." 
In the present proceeding, Alves, by writ of review, is chal-
lenging the jurisdiction of the commission to curtail his oper-
ations. The controversy centers upon the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support its order. 
There is no serious dispute as to the faets. Briefly stated, 
they are as follows: 
Alves commenced business in 1946 with two trucks. At 
present, his fleet consists of 14 tractors, 14 semitrailers, and 
./ 
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two "bob-tail" trucks. At all times since 1946 he has held 
radial higbway common carrier and highway contract carrier 
permits. He has never held, nor applied for, a certificate of 
public convenience and necesSity to operate as a highway com-
mon carrier. 
He maintains offices, with facilities for parking equipment, 
in San Leandro and Los Angeles. Although he operates on 
no fixed schedule, almost daily his trucks carry shipments be-
tween the San Francisco Bay area and the Los Angeles area 
in both directions. The shortest route between the point of 
departure and the destination is used. Besides his frequent 
service between the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas, he 
transports goods to a large number of other points throughout 
the state. 
According to Alves, he does not ~olicit any business or 
advertise, although his name appc~rs in the classified section 
of the telephone directory. During the first six months after 
he commenced business, about 10 persons· tendered property 
to him for transportation. In 1948, his customers consisted 
of at least 27 different persons or corporations. He added 10 
more shippers in 1949 and another six in 1950. He has a 
written contract with only one of these customers. With four 
others he has oral contracts, although in at least two instances 
there is some dispute as to whether the oral agreement con-
btitutes a binding contract. His list of customers is variable, 
some being dropped and some being added from time to time. 
Shipping orders are accepted by telephone. The evidence 
.reasonably would support a finding that he accepts newcus-
tomers within the limitS of his equipment, and that any re-
fusals to carry goods have been based upon economic con-
siderations. 
Apparently he is willing to carry any type of freight. His 
shipments range in weight from one pound to 19~,180 pounds 
and in type from fresh flowers to heavy machinery. The equip-
reent which he uses is similar to that of other carriers, rather 
than being of any specialized type to meet the needs of par-
ticular customers. 
Alves contends that· he does not operate as a bigh,vay com-
mon carrier, nor does he operate between fixed termini or over 
a regular route. The evidence, he says, is insufficient to sus-
tain the finding that he has dedicated his property to a public 
use. In addition, he argues that the suspension of his permits 
was arbitrary, unreasonable, and an abuse of discretion. By 
/ 
/ , 
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its answer to his petition, the commission disputes each of 
these contentions. 
The situation here presented is entirely different from that 
in the Samuelson and Souza cases, supra, upon which Alves 
relies. Samuelson was operating under only 8 highway con-
tract carrier permit. His operations were restricted to an 
arbitrary limit of 80 shippers at anyone time. He had served 
only 47 shippers during his entire period of operations. He 
did not solicit business and he limited the type of freight 
which he would carry. With all shippers he had written or 
oral contracts. The commission issued a cease and desist order 
upon the ground that Samuelson was not conducting his busi-
ness with "substantial restrictiveness." This court annulled 
the order because there was no showing that Samuelson un-
equivocally intended to dedicate his property to a public use. 
We said: "The 'substantial restrictiveness' doctrine excludes 
this intention, or at least reduces it to only incidental impor-
tance." (P. 783.) 
In the Souza case a substantially similar situation was pre-
sented, although Souza was operating under both radial high-
way common carrier and highway contract carrier permits. 
From the record, however, it appeared that he had not oper-
ated as a common carrier, despite the fact that he had a 
permit to do so. This court, for the same reasons as those 
stated in the Samuelson case, aunulled the commission's order 
suspending his permits. We held it unnecessary to. consider 
the question whether the commission could properly refuse 
to separate a permittee's common carrier operations from his 
contract carrier business. 
[1] In the instant case, however, there is evidence of a 
large scale and growing enterprise serving aU profitable busi-
ness offered within the limitations of its equipment. The vast 
majority of shippers are served without contractual arrange-
ments. No limit is placed on the type, or weight, of product 
carried. It does not appear that any profitable business was 
refused, or that any limit was placed upon the number of 
shippers served. From such evidence, the commission reason-
ably could conclude that Alves unequivocally intended to 
dedicatebis property to a public use. The evidence of fre-
quent service between certain cities is also sufficient to support 
a finding that, at least as to some of his business, he operated 
between fixed termini. 
But -even if Alves was operating as a common carrier, he 
held a valid permit entitling him to do 80. There is also evi-
/ 
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dence tending to prove that, in addition to common carriage, 
he was operating as a highway contract carrier, for which 
he likewise held a permit. It becomes important, therefore, 
to distinguish carefully between the various types of operation 
which Alves might have conducted. 
The Highway Oarriers' Act (Stats. 1935, ch. 223, p. 878, 
as amended; 2 Deering's Gen. IJaws. 1949 Supp., Act 5129a; 
repealed by Stats. 1951, ch. 764, pp. 2025, 2257-2258; now 
Pub. Util. Oode, § 3501 et seq.) at the time of the commence· 
ment of this proceeding contained the following definitions: 
HThe term 'highway common carrier' when used in this act 
means every highway carrier operating as a common carrier 
subject to regulation as such by the Railroad Oommission 
under the Public Utilities Act of the State of Oalifornia as 
amended." (§ l[g]; now Pub. Util. Oode, § 3513.) 
"The term I radial highway common carrier' when used in 
this act means every highway carrier operating as a common 
carrier not heretofore subject to regulation as such by the 
Railroad Oommission under the Public Utilities Act of the 
State of Oalifornia, as amended." (§ l[h]; now Pub. Util. 
Code, § 3516.) 
"The term I highway contract camer' when used in this act 
means every highway carrier other than a highway common 
carrier as defined in subsection (g) and every radial highway 
common carrier as defined in subsection (h)." (§ l[i]; now 
Pub. Util. Oode, § 3517.) 
Section 2% of the Public Utilities Act (Stats. 1915, ch. 91, 
p. 115, as add('d by Stats. 1935, ch. 664, p. 1831, as amended; 
2 Deering's Gen. Laws, 1949 Supp., Act 6386; repealed by 
Stats. 1951, ch. 764, pp. 2025, 2257; now Pub. Util. Code, 
§ 201 et seq.) provided these further definitions: 
"The term 'highway common carrier' when used in this act 
means every corporation or person, ... operating ... any 
auto truck . . . used in the business of tram;portation of 
property as a common carrier for compensation over any pub. 
lic highway in this State between fixed termini or over a 
regular route, ... " (§ 2% [a] ; now Pub. Util. Code, § 213.) 
"The words 'between fixed termini or over a regular route' 
when used in this act mean the termini or route between or 
over which any highway common carrier usually or ordi-
narily operates any auto truck . . . even though there may 
be departures from said termini or route, whether such 
departures be periodic or irregular. Whether or not any 
auto truck • • • is operated by a highway common carrier 
350 .ALVES tI. PUBLIC UTILITIES COM. l410.2<1 
'between fixed termini or over a regular route' within the 
meaning of this act shall be a question of fact and the findings 
of the commission thereon shall be subject to review." (§ 2% 
[b] ; now Pub. Utile Code, § 215.) 
Reading these various definitions as a whole, the fol-
lowing pattern of possible types of transportation appears. 
[2] A "highway common carrier ... subject to regulation as 
such" by the Public Utilities Commission is a highway carrier 
transporting" property as a common carrier for compensation 
• • . between fixed termini or over a regular route." A com-
mon carrier by auto truck which does not operate between 
fixed termini or over a regular route is a "radial highway 
common carrier." Thus, the difference between two possible 
types of common carriage is dependent upon whether it is 
performed "between fixed termini or over a regular route." 
[3] The third possible type of highway carriage with which 
we are concerned is the "highway contract carrier," defined 
by exclusion as every highway carrier which is not a common 
earrier operating between fixed termini or over a regular 
route. In other words, if it does not operate as a common 
carrier, the highway contract carrier may operate between 
fixed termini or over a regular route. 
[4] Alves held permits to operate both as a radial highway 
common carrier and as a highway contract carrier. Thus, 
under the quoted statutory definitions, he legally could operate 
as a common carrier; he could also transport goods as a con-
tract carrier between fixed termini or over a regular route. 
But he could not operate as a common carrier between fixed 
termini or over a regular route. The commission has entirely 
ignored this essential distinction. Although it found that 
Alves operated as a highway common carrier between fixed 
termini and over regular routes, it did not find that he con-
ducted specified common carrier operations between certain 
fixed termini. The specific findings are simply that he oper-
ated as a common carrier and that he operated between certain 
fixed termini. 
In a supplemental brief, filed at the request of this court, 
the commission states that it treated the problem "as having 
two parts, ,. each of which it resolved separately. It first deter-
mined whether Alves was operating as a common carrier, 
without regard to the termini served. Then, assuming "that 
the carrier's operations are those of a common carricr," it 
determined whether h(l opernt('o between particular pairs of 
termini, or over particular routes. 
) 
) 
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According to the commission, it "does not claim that the 
evidence in the present record warrants a finding that opera-
tions between any particular pair of termini, ... considered 
apart from the rest, were those of a common carrier." It 
states: "Having found that ... [Alves') business, consid-
ered as an undifferentiated whole, was that of a common car-
rier, and having then found that some of his operations were 
between fixed termini and over regular routes, the Commis-
sion considered that . . • [his) operations between those ter-
mini and over those routes were those of a common carrier." 
In effect, the commission concedes that there is no evidence 
which would support a finding that Alves transported prop-
erty as a common carrier between fixed termini or over a 
regular route. 
[5] The commission apparently is relying upon the rule 
which it laid down in Pacific Southwest Ra'tlroad Assn. v. 
Stapel, 49 Cal. Pub. UtiI. Com. 407. It there said that it will 
not consider a carrier's operations in segments. If a carrier 
operates a portion of an integrated business as a common car-
rier, and another portion of its business as a contract carrier 
between fixed termini, applying the rule of the Stapel case, 
the commission will combine the entire business to find that 
the carrier is operating as a common carrier between fixed 
termini. Such a rule is arbitrary and unreasonable, at least 
as applied to a carrier holding both radial highway common 
carrier and highway contract carrier permits. By the Stapel 
rule, as to such a carrier, legal operation. under each permit 
would constitute illegal operation as a highway common car-
rier. 
In this case, there being no evidence of operations between 
fixed termini as a common carrier, application of the Stapel 
rule contravenes section 4 of the Highway Carriers' Act. 
(Stats. 1935, ch. 223, p. 878, as amended; 2 Deering'S Gen. 
Laws [1943), Act 5129a; repealed by Stats .. 1951, ch. 764, 
pp. 2025, 2257-2258; now Pub. UtH. Code, § 3542.) It pro-
vided: "No person or corporation shall be permitted by the 
Railroad Commission to engage, nor shall any person or cor-
poration engage in the transportation of property on the 
public highway, both as a common carrier and as a highway 
contract carrier of the same commodities between the same 
points. " [6] The clear implication of the statute is that a 
carrier may engage in both common and contract carriage, so 
long as the same commodities are not carried between the 
same points in both capacities. Whether Alves has violated 
J 
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the stai.t:u restriction bas not been decided by the commission, 
and the evidence does not tend to show any such violation. 
The order is annulled. 
Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Alves has permits under which he may 
legally operate both as a radial common carrier and ru; a 
highway contract carrier. Under these permits he may operate 
as a contract carrier between fixed termini or over regular 
routes; he may not do so, however, as a common carrier. 
Since part of his operations are between fixed termini, the 
question presented is whether there is substantial evidence 
to support the commission's finding that he conducts these 
operations as a common carrier rather than as a contract 
carrier. Since the commission concedes that the evidence 
would not support a finding "that operations between any 
particular pair of termini, . . . considered apart from tke 
rest, were those of a common carrier," the majority opinion 
concludes that there is no evidence to support the commis-
sion's finding. (Italics added.) In this case, however, the 
determination of the character of the carriage between any 
particular pair of termini cannot be made by considering such 
carriage by itself. 
In Samuelson v. Public Utilities Com., 36 Cal.2d 722, 733 
[227 P.2d 256], the court stated that "the common law test 
of common carriage . . . requires an unequivocal intention 
to dedicate property to a public use." (See, also, Souza v. 
Public Utilities Corn., 37 Ca1.2d 539, 543 [233 P.2d 537).) As 
the majority opinion points out, this intent may be manifested 
by the manner in which the business is conducted: •• In the 
instant case, however, there is evidence of a large scale and 
growing enterprise serving all profitable business offered with-
in the limitations of its equipment. The vast majority of 
shippers are served without contractual arrangements. No 
limit is placed on the type, or weight, of product carried. It 
does not appear that any profitable business was refused, or 
that any limit was placed upon the number of shippers served. 
From such evidence, the commission reasonably could conclude 
that Alves unequivocally intended to dedicate his property to 
a public use." If consideration is restricted, however, to a 
particular segment of the business, it may be impossible to 
determine what the carrier's intent is. Thus as between a 
.riven pair of termini, the carriage, although regular, may be 
) 
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for so fe,,, shippers that it cannot be determined whether the 
carrier is selecting his clientele, or in reality holding himself 
out to serve the public generally. In such cases only by 
looking to the overall plan of the carrier's operations can it be 
determined on what basis he is operating the limited segments 
thereof. Thus if it appears from the overall operations that 
the business is being conducted on a common carrier basis, 
it is reasonable to infer that the regular carriage between each 
pair of termini is being conducted in the same manner. 
To permit this inference to be drawn does not result in 
denying a carrier having both radial common carrier and 
highway contract carrier permits the right to conduct both 
types of business. By implying that it does, the majority 
opinion confuses the question of what types of operations are 
legally permissible with the question of how the existence of 
any given type may be proved. If in fact the operations be-
tween fixed termini or over regular routes are conducted on a 
contract rather than on a common carrier basis, the carrier 
should have no difficulty in so showing. In the present case, 
however, the evidence of the character of the operations be-
tween each pair of termini, when considered alone, is equivocal. 
Alves has not demonstrated that his method of operation be-
tween fixed termini differs from his method of operation in 
general. Accordingly, the commission was justified in con-
cluding that the general pattern of common carrier operation 
that appeared from Alves' business when considered as a 
whole, established that his operations between fixed termini 
were of the same sort. 
I would affirm the order. 
Gibson, C. J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied September 
10, 1953. Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and SPCl1CC, J., were of 
th .. opinion that the petition .should be 4:ranted.. 
61. c.3I:l-ll 
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